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Abstract
This paper discusses the reasons for the success of the New Growth
Theory. Given that the NGT has a somewhat tautological quality,
that its essential ideas have been known for a long time, and that it
does not make contact with a large literature on institutions and
economic change, its strong success is arguably surprising. At any
rate, it causes problems for models of scientific change that focus on
novel facts as a criterion of progress, such as Lakatos’. The success of
the NGT is better explained by, for example, Laudan’s focus on
increased problem-solving ability as an important cause of scientific
change.
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2Introduction
This paper is in the nature of a primarily methodological reflection on what is
now generally known as “the new growth theory” (henceforth, NGT).1  It is to
some extent a progress report, that is, an attempt to clarify and organize
thoughts and present the results of this process. However, it is more than
simply a summary of existing doctrine. For I have from the beginning of my
(brief) interest in the subject been somewhat surprised by the enormous
attention that proponents of the NGT have received, not only in professional
circles but also in the more popular press (notably, in The Economist). The
reasons for being baffled are many.2 Here are some of  these:
1. The most important thing about the NGT is not that it appears to put
forward any “novel facts”, in the Lakatosian sense (Lakatos 1970) of the
word, namely some new fact about the empirical world. In fact, it is hard
to find such novel facts in the NGT. It is true, of course, that in the NGT
the long-run rate of growth is not explained by the growth of population -
as in the traditional Solow model - but by knowledge accumulation.
However, that knowledge accumulation is behind the growth process is
not a new recognition in economics. Relatedly, the overall welfare and
policy conclusions - for example, that investment in human capital is
suboptimally low  and that general education is therefore called for - can
hardly be called novel either.
 
                                         
1  I shall not here consider the closely allied “new trade theory”, although what I have to say
may have implications for this body of theory, too.
2  In fact, I am even more surprised by the fact that so few observers seem to be baffled! An
exception is Mankiw (1993, p.300) who in a rather unimpressed discussion flatly says that the
NGT “...has been oversold by its advocates”.
32. There is a certain tautological quality to the NGT:  If we assume that
knowledge is a motor force behind growth because of the externalities
that the process of knowledge accumulation creates, then it is surely
comforting to be told as a conclusion that different rates of growth in
knowledge accumulation leads to different rates of long-run growth!
 
3. The NGT would seem to obtain part of its tautological character because
the institutions and firm dynamics underlying the process of knowledge-
accumulation and growth is not theorized. Or, to put it more bluntly, Why
don’t Romer, Lucas, Rebelo, Grossman et al. read Douglass North (1990)
or Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) or even Fukuyama (1995)?
 
4. Related to the preceding point, we may ask - along Coasean lines - why
institutions do not arise to internalize the knowledge externalities that are
so important to the growth process (Weder and Grubel 1993; Richard
Langlois and Paul Robertson 1996). More generally, why aren’t property
rights and transaction costs considered in the NGT? If there is one thing
that we know is necessary to “make a miracle” (to borrow a line from
Robert Lucas 1993), this is that the matrix of property rights has to be
secure and relatively well-defined.
 
5. Stripped to their non-mathematical essentials, the basic mechanisms that
are highlighted in the NGT have been known for a long time. Almost
sixty years ago, Allyn Young (1928)  (no, not Alwyn Young), to some
extent building on the even older work of Alfred Marshall (1890), pointed
to the centrality of externalities - pecuniary as well as technological - and
increasing returns in the growth process.  That it is good to include some
market power so that R&D outlays can be rationalized (Paul Romer 1990)
is hardly a new recognition either. Moreover, Kenneth Arrow (1962) long
4ago pointed to the role of learning by doing in the growth process, a factor
that has been highlighted in the NGT. Finally, Richard Nelson (1994)
argues that most of the substantial content of the new growth theory was
in fact presented in 1952 by Moses Abramowitz. Thus, it is doubtful
whether there is nothing inherently new or revolutionary about the NGT;
in retrospect, it may turn out to have been a much more incremental
development than other developments during the last two decades, such
as rational expectations, equilibrium business cycles, work on incentive
compatibility and contract theory, etc.
 
In the following pages, I shall explain and expand on these points.
However, I shall do something more than present a critical perspective on the
NGT. For if I am right in claiming, for example, that there is a tautological
quality to the NGT and, moreover, that the theory (in the light of the history of
economic thought) does not really address any new theoretical mechanisms,
then what is all the fuss about? Why is the NGT, along with work on incentives
and contracts, the probably most prestigious sub-discipline the budding young
economist can choose as her area of specialization?
I shall suggest that the explanation of the apparent success of the
NGT should be sought, not in the ability to say something new and interesting
about empirical reality per se, but primarily in the apparent expansion of the
problem-solving capacity of general equilibrium theory that the NGT
undeniably represents. This in itself is an important lesson about neoclassical
economists’ criteria for theory choice: Success is not primarily a matter of
putting forward and explaining some novel fact (although this may help) - it is
5a matter of bringing general equilibrium theory closer to empirical reality by
endogenizing something that has hitherto been treated as exogenous.3
Assuredly, it is possible to explain the breakthrough of NGT in
other, more externally oriented, ways, or by pointing to seemingly “irrational”
motives. For example, at the end of the 1980s enthusiasm in macroeconomics
and business cycle theory apparently had faded somewhat as more “structural”
policies came increasingly into focus.  Moreover, we should not be blind to the
existence of fads in economic research. These latter observations may, however,
be consistent with the above, more “internal”, explanation.
As the reader has no doubt become aware of by now, there is a
strong negative quality to the argument of this paper.  And critique - at least of
the more encompassing sort - without any alternative is in a sense rather
pointless. However, I do think that there exists theoretical alternatives to the
NGT, even if these cannot conform to the formal standards imposed by
proponents of the NGT. Future work will be concerned with arguing that, for
example, Douglass North’s (1990) work on institutional change and economic
growth in fact constitutes a rival and  - in a substantive (if not formal) sense -
superior body of work.
                                         
3  Thus, the methodological perspective I here adopt owes more to Larry Laudan (1977) than to
Imre Lakatos (1970).
6The New Growth Theory
“Technological advance, resting in new knowledge and
occurring accidentally or mechanically, seems to be the only
possible offset to this ‘natural’ tendency to diminishing
returns” (Frank Knight 1944).
In this section, I provide a brief conspectus of the key contributions to the NGT,
and present some critiques of these. I only focus on three contributions - Romer
(1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988) - out of an already very large literature.4 My
justification for being so narrow is that these are arguably the seminal
contributions, and that the critical points I wish to make presumably also apply
to the rest of the literature. The critical points are mainly those mentioned in the
Introduction.
A. Background and Key Contributions
The story begins, not with Allyn Young, Schumpeter and their lot, and not even
with Harrod, Domar or Kaldor, but with Robert Solow (1956, 1957).  First,
Solow made economic growth understandable in terms of neoclassical
economics. The ambition of both Harrod and Domar, in contrast, apparently
was to provide a long-run counterpart to Keynes’ macroeconomics (Graham
Hacche 1979, p.3). Solow’s (1956) early work is often referred to as “the
neoclassical model” to differentiate it from the NGT (e.g., Romer 1994)5.
Second, he presented a puzzle, namely the nature of the famous “Solow
residual”: If increases in the stock of labor and capital only explain a small part
                                         
4  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provides a well-written and accessible overview of the field.
5  Of course, this is something of a misnomer because the NGT is quintessentially neoclassical.
7of the observed growth in industrial countries, what explains the rest (Solow
1957)?
The nature of puzzle did not really concern what was underneath
the residual, for even then there was agreement that human capital
accumulation and technological progress were the main drivers behind the
productivity advances of  labor and capital. The puzzle was more in the nature
of precisely accounting for these mechanisms - of endogenizing them. Arrow’s
(1962) introduction of learning by doing effects was one important advance in
this directions as was later models on embodied capital.
In the beginning of the 1970s interest in growth theory petered out,
however, in favor of macroeconomics and business cycle theory. Monetarism,
equilibrium business cycle theory and rational expectations became all the rage
for some one and half decade. Gradually, however, interest in business cycle
theory shifted away from monetary factors towards an appreciation of real
factors (e.g., Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott 1982) and policy-makers’
interests shifted toward more long-run and “structural” issues.  Arguably all
this helped pave the way for the wildfire of interest in growth theory that hit
the profession at the end of the 1980s.6
The initiating event clearly was the publication of Paul Romer’s
1986 article on “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”. At least three, and
perhaps four, slightly different streams of research - or more precisely:
modeling strategies - within the NGT are identifiable.  The first is that
associated with Romer’s initial paper (Romer 1986); the second one is
associated with the work of Robert Lucas (1988, 1993); the third, and arguably
dominant, modeling strategy is that pioneered by Romer (1990) (this is the one
                                         
6  This is pure speculation on my part. One tiny piece of evidence, however, concerns the
centrality of Lucas and Barro in both efforts.
8that is often referred to as “endogenous growth theory”); and a possible fourth
approach is that represented by Aghion and Howitt (1992) that is differentiated
by drawing on the patent-race literature.
These approaches differ, for example, with respect to whether a
competitive equilibrium or a monopolistic competition equilibrium is used as
the basic set-up, although they are of course all built on some notion of
economies of scale as the ultimate driver of persistent growth.7 Romer’s 1986
model was a competitive equilibrium model as are Lucas’  (1988, 1993) models;
however, building on the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Romer (1990) - and
with him a number of new growth theorists - have preferred to work with
monopolistic competition models.
However, a more convenient way to put in perspective some of
these different  modeling approaches is to focus on the aggregate production
postulated in these models (Howard Pack 1994). The standard production
function postulated in Solowian growth model takes the form:  Y = Aemt KaL1-a ,
where Y is gross national product, K is the stock of capital (both physical and
human), A is a constant that reflects the technological start position of the
relevant economy, L is unskilled labor, em represents the exogenous rate at
which technology evolves, and a represents the percentage increase in gross
national product from a 1 % increase in capital.
Empirically, a is derived simply from capital’s share in the national
income account, which means that implicitly capital is taken to be paid its
marginal product and to yield no externalities (Pack 1994). It is this aspect
which is changed in many models of the NGT. Importantly, this helps
                                         
7  In fact, it would appear to be axiomatic in this literature that economies of scale are
necessary to any theoretical understanding of the growth process.  However, as Milgrom, Qian
and Roberts (1991) point out, (Edgeworth) complementarities can do the job independently of
scale considerations.
9addressing the obvious deficiency of the standard formulation: The
determinants of m, the rate of growth of income per capita, are left unaddressed
in the model.
A compact overall formulation that captures the main ideas of the
different modeling strategies in the NGT is the following aggregate production
function: Y = F (K, L, H, A) (we do not need to care here about specific
functional forms), where we now explicitly makes a distinction between
physical and human capital. Moreover, A is no longer a constant.
For example, Romer (1986) considers a simplified version of the
above production function, namely Y =  A(R) F (Ri, Ki, Li), where Ri is the stock
of results from expenditure on R&D by firm i and where spillovers from
private research efforts lead to improvements in the public stock of knowledge,
A(R). Because Romer’s set-up is a competitive equilibrium, he assumes F to be
homogenous of degree one in all inputs. Thus, there are, in Marshall’s (1890)
words, no “internal economies” in the model, only the “external economies”
represented by A(R). One may say that these externalities offset the propensity
to diminishing returns to the other inputs
Underlying this is a view of technological knowledge as having, to
some extent, public good characteristics, that is, it is not fully excludable and it
is non-rival - a view that characterizes all of the NGT. As Romer (1986, p.1003)
explains: “The creation of new knowledge by one firm is assumed to have a
positive external effect on the production possibilities of other firms, because
knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or kept secret”.  A mechanism behind
this effect is that the marginal cost of using new knowledge is assumed to be
zero or close to zero. The low costs of using existing knowledge is also assumed
to lower the costs of producing new knowledge, thus causing dynamic scale
economies in knowledge accumulation. Because of the assumption of only
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partial excludability, there are intertemporal positive externalities from private
knowledge accumulation efforts.
The presence of knowledge externalities is not only the driver
behind increasing returns, but also where the model makes contact with
welfare issues. The conclusion, of course, is the one that has generally
characterized neoclassical work on the welfare properties of the innovation
process, namely that firms when investing in research will only take private
and not social benefits into account, thus causing a suboptimal level of
investment in knowledge.
Lucas (1988) essentially also reaches this conclusion, albeit with a
different set-up. He begins with an aggregate production function of the form:
Y =  A(H) F (K,H), which corresponds to two different sectors and two different
types of investment, namely in physical capital and in human capital. As in
Romer (1986), the propensity to diminishing returns in an input, in this case H,
is offset by externalities, in this case caused by the input itself: “...let the average
level of skill or human capital...contribute to the productivity of all factors of
production” (Lucas 1988, p. 18). As in Romer’s (1986) model, the competitive
equilibrium is suboptimal. Of course, in Lucas’ model, it is the accumulation of
human capital that is suboptimal.
Romer (1990) is the perhaps most important single contribution to
the NGT. It is a three-sector model that allows for internal economies, which
means that price-taking competitive equilibrium cannot be supported.
Monopolistic competition is introduced to reflect the presence of market power.
The aggregate production function may be written as Y = F (K, L, H, A), where
the stock of knowledge about technology A is assumed to be non-rival, L is
measured by the number of people in the workforce, K is disaggregated into a
continuum of producers’ goods, and human capital, H, represents on-the-job
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training and education. This functional form suppress, however, the complex
structure of the model.
Using human capital and the existing stock of knowledge, the
research sector produces “designs” for producers’ goods under increasing
returns to scale. Specifically, there are increased marginal productivity to
human capital in the research sector. Private firms in this sector invest in R&D
activities and produce and commercialize a new widget. But the knowledge
developed on a private basis spills over into the stock of general knowledge
which can be applied by other firms in the research sector in the production of
“wedgets”, “wudgets” and “wodgets”. Each new product in turn contributes to
stock of non-depreciating general knowledge, which implies that the marginal
productivity of the human capital employed in the research sector is increasing
over time.
The producers’ goods sector then uses these designs for producing
producers’ goods, which are then applied in the consumers’ goods sector by
firms with market power. Solving the model, Romer finds that the rate of
growth is determined by the stock of human capital that is employed in
research, and that this stock will increase with the total stock of human capital
in the population.
B. Critique
Given that the NGT has been in existence for about a decade - provided, as
seems reasonable, that Romer (1986) is taken to be the founding contribution
-there are surprisingly few contributions that are more radically critical of the
approach (except for Nelson 1994; Pack 1994; Solow 1994; Weder and Grubel
1993; Langlois and Robertson 1996).8 Most debate seems to take place between
                                         
8  This may be contrasted with the advent of the new classical macroeconomics which
immediate provoked heated debate. (There are many overall similarities between the NGT and
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contributors to the NGT and to concern the specific modeling strategies
employed  (Romer 1994).  In contrast, the following points are more in the
nature of “external” critiques.
Tautological reasoning. Robert Solow (1994, p. 53) noted that “[t]he idea of
endogenous growth so captures the imagination that growth theorists often just
insert favorable assumptions in an unearned way; and then when they put in
their thumb and pull out the very plum they have inserted, there is a tendency
to think that something has been proved”.  In other words, Solow accused the
proponents of the NGT of tautological reasoning, although he did not provide
examples.
However, these are easy to find. At the broadest level, they
characterize the whole explanatory approach of the NGT. This basically argues
that if knowledge is a peculiar good that implies increasing returns because of
externalities, then the level of knowledge and the accumulation of knowledge
can explain, for example, differences in growth among nations (Lucas 1988,
1993). By thus designing the assumptions we make with respect to knowledge
to reflect the phenomenon we wish to “explain” (inserting “favorable
assumptions in an unearned way”), we never really get to know whether it
actually is knowledge that drives the growth process, whether there are some
deeper determinants that perhaps warrant scrutiny, etc.
A more specific example of tautological reasoning can be found in
Robert Lucas’ 1993 paper, “Making a Miracle”.9 This is essentially a follow-up
                                                                                                                 
the new classical macroeconomics, such as the use made of representative agent constructions,
dynamic programming, the attempt to model in equilibrium terms what had hitherto often
been taken to be disequilibrium phenomena, etc.). The difference may be a matter of the NGT
not presenting the harsh policy conclusions that characterized the new classical
macroeconomics, but on the contrary supporting standard neoclassical conclusions on optimal
investment in knowledge.
9  This example is from Matthias Kelm (1995, p. 18).
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on his 1988 paper, and the made miracles he refer to are the East Asian
economies. This motivates asking “How did it happen? Why did it happen in
Korea and Taiwan, and not in the Philippines?” (Lucas 1993, p. 252). Lucas
argues that accumulation of human capital is underneath the successful growth
experience of Korea and Taiwan, and that the Philippines’ failure to sustain a
human capital accumulation on the same level explains why it has lagged
behind. Lucas then concludes by saying that his modeling efforts have “...the
virtue of being consistent with the recent experience of both the Philippines and
Korea. It would be equally consistent with post-1960 history with the roles of
these two economies switched. It is a picture that is consistent with any
individual small economy following the East Asian example” (Lucas 1993,
p.271).  As Kelm (1995, p.18) sarcastically points out, Lucas “...celebrates as a
virtue his model’s failure to answer his own question: ‘Why in Korea and
Taiwan, and not in the Philippines?’”.
Transaction Costs, Property Rights, etc. Both Weder and Grubel (1993) and
Langlois and Robertson (1996) criticize the NGT on Coasean grounds. As we
have seen, the stock of knowledge (whatever that means) is considered in the
NGT to be a non-rival factor production; this is what creates the basis for
dynamically increasing returns to scale. Knowledge spillovers ensure that what
comes out of one research lab is instantaneously available to other research labs
at no cost. However, as  Weder and Grubel (1993) and Langlois and Robertson
(1996) point out, in real economies there are numerous institutions that
internalize these externalities, such as industrial associations and industrial
clusters.
This means that implicitly the NGT assumes (in an unwarranted
way?) the presence of some transaction costs that hinder the internalization of
the relevant technological externalities. Clearly, in fact, the presence of those
14
costs are crucial to the argument; otherwise there would not be any
uncompensated knowledge spillovers. However, we should recognize that
underneath all transaction cost problems are defective knowledge of some sort
(Carl Dahlman 1979). But the implicit admission of transaction costs into the
model is hard (if perhaps not impossible) to align with the fact that the NGT
assumes that research labs have perfect absorptive capacity (they can
immediately internalize the results of other labs).10 More generally, if we stand
ready to acknowledge that knowledge for exchange purposes is not perfect,
then why assume that knowledge on the domain of production is perfect
(Langlois and Foss 1996)?11
At any rate, it is apparent that the NGT simply does not make
contact with the whole corpus of neo-institutional economics, with its emphasis
on property rights, measurement problems, transaction costs, and how these
translate into the institutional fabric of society and thereby crucially influence
the wealth of nations (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; North 1990; Thráinn
Eggertson 1990). At best these determinants are all hidden underneath specific
functional forms, at worst the theorist simply doesn’t consider them.  Little
wonder, then, that Douglass North  can think of growth theory as “begging all
the important questions” (as quoted in Langlois and Robertson 1996, p.24-25).
Now, from one perspective this is completely defensible, for we are
here talking about different levels of analysis, and we cannot apriori condemn
                                         
10 Of course, this sort of inconsistency is very common in neoclassical economics, also in
supposedly “rigorous” theory. For example, in standard, non-transaction cost price theory, the
monopolist is assumed to sell at a single price and induce a deadweight welfare loss, when
none of these phenomena can in fact take place unless some transaction costs are assumed to
exist.
11  Doing this would bring us into differential capabilities and a completely different
microfoundation for growth theory. This theme will not be pursued here, but see Nelson
(1994), Pack (1994), Langlois and Robertson (1996) and Thomsen (1996) for some stimulating
discussions.
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a theory for not incorporating a specific level of analysis. This is a view that
Romer (1996, p. 203) clearly  endorses:
“What theories do is [to] take all the available complicated
information about the world and organize it into [a] kind of
hierarchical structure.
In building this structure, good theory indicates how to carve
a system at the joints. At each level, theory breaks a system down
into a simple collection of subsystems that interact in a meaningful
way”.
This may be granted, as may Romer’s accompanying statement that
“...explanation operates on many levels that must be consistent with each
other” (idem.).
What is noteworthy here is the emphasis on consistency between
explanation that move on different levels of analysis. For there is, in fact, no
guarantee that an approach to growth that begins from the individual
transaction or the exchange of property rights will yield the same predictions or
welfare conclusions as the much more aggregate NGT analyses. In the context
of the general neoclassical property rights model (Thráinn Eggertson 1990), the
NGT, because of its emphasis on knowledge externalities, is implicitly making
specific assumptions about the enforcement and exchange of property rights,
and therefore about transaction costs.
This is not necessarily to say that these assumptions are
unwarranted. But it is to say that they need fuller justification and that there is
a latent conflict between neoclassical (property rights) analysis conducted at a
very low level of analysis and neoclassical analysis conducted at higher levels
of analysis. For example, it is not at all clear that an analyst that began from the
lower level of analysis would reach the same welfare conclusions (or frame the
problem in the same way) as an analyst that began from a higher level.
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Finally, if the NGT really is (as Romer (1996) argues) what we may
call “history-friendly”, in that it explicitly leans on economic history for
inspiration, then why aren’t key insights from economic history incorporated?
We do know that a regime of well-defined, alienable and extensive property
rights that are cast within the rule of law is not a bad recipe for creating
growth. This is not the prejudices of a libertarian; it is an empirical fact (where
is the counter-example?) that finds substantial support in theory (Peter Boettke
1995).  Isn’t this the sort of “stylized fact” that should serve as a foundation for
growth theory?
Old hat? If Nelson (1994) is right, Abramovitz (1952) presented the rudiments -
perhaps even the essential mechanisms - of the NGT. However, we can go
further back in doctrinal history. As Langlois and Robertson (1996) point out,
the idea of knowledge externalities as a motor of growth and dynamism was
employed by Alfred Marshall. His often quoted analysis of the industrial
district in Principles (1890) is a case in point, as is his major study on Industry
and Trade (1923). In the Marshallian tradition, Allyn Young (1928) powerfully
restated the classical theory of the progressive division of labor and placed
increasing returns - from both pecuniary and technological externalities -
centerstage in the growth process. And even earlier, the idiosyncratic, but
occasionally brilliant, Thorstein Veblen (1914) had made knowledge
accumulation central to the growth process.12
Seemingly, research markets are not fully efficient (as Stigler (1982)
argues); significant ideas are not just smoothly absorbed in existing theory; the
profession forgets. Or, so it would seem. For it is entirely likely that the
profession knew of Marshall, Young and Veblen’s ideas - but simply did not
                                         
12  In fairness, it should be noted that contributors to the NGT are aware of the contributions of
Marshall and Young.
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know what to do with them, because existing methods did not allow the
incorporation of the phenomena that these theorists had identified into the core
of economic theory, namely general equilibrium. Of course, it is not just that
Young and Veblen were outsiders - as they clearly were - relative to the
neoclassical mainstream and its core of general equilibrium theory, for Solow,
Nordhaus, Arrow and many others were critically aware of the importance of
knowledge accumulation and knowledge externalities in the growth process.
The difficulties must have been somewhere else.
One problem, of course, was to reconcile a notion of economies of
scale - namely what Marshall called “external economies” - with competitive
equilibrium. This problem was essentially solved by Masahiko Aoki in 1970,
and his model is very close to the micro-foundation of Romer (1986). Later
developments, notably by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), helped put the theory of
monopolistic competition on a rigorous footing and stimulated its application
in macroeconomics, and later in growth theory. In the eyes of the profession,
the charm of the latter approach was that macroeconomic modeling was no
longer wedded to competitive equilibrium but could come to grips with real-
world phenomena such as product diversity and internal economies of scale.
This suggest that while the NGT is in some substantive sense old
hat, the role of more technical developments in the core of general equilibrium
theory, and how these developments helped formalize older ideas (or, as
formal economists say, “intuition”), is crucial to understanding the
development and the success of the NGT. In the following section, I shall make
an attemp to account for the apparent success of the NGT.
Accounting for the Growth of the NGT:
A Methodological Perspective
18
It is beyond dispute that the NGT has met with considerable success in the
economics profession and is generally hailed as an important example of
theoretical progress, arguably the most important, in the development of
economics in the last decade. Given what has been said above, this is surely
surprising: how can a theory that incorporates a significant amount of
tautological reasoning, neglects almost completely those societal institutions
which an impressive number of economists have seen as absolute essential to
economic growth, and basically restates in formal terms older ideas, be so
successful? In short, which factors account for the growth of the NGT?
In order to successfully address this question, we obviously have to
turn to an analysis of the criteria that economists use to evaluate new theories,
that is, to issues of methodology. Here, in fact, we are assisted by a large, and
largely Anglo-Saxon, literature in the philosophy of science, often called “the
growth of knowledge literature”, which specifically addresses this issue, and
which has been extensively used by economic methodologists.  The key names
in this literature are Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Larry
Laudan, and I shall be concerned with the latter two here.13
In contrast to Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos (1970) distinguishes
several levels at which scientific change may occur. To Popper, scientific change
is a matter of the fate of bold conjectures that are formulated as individual
theories: are they falsified? Or, are they corrobated, adding to our stock of
scientific knowledge? To Kuhn scientific change is a matter of the fate of much
more aggregate phenomena, what he calls “paradigms”: do these scientific
belief systems prosper or are they steadily accumulating anomalies that will
eventually lead to their demise? The attraction of Lakatos’ work is that he
incorporates in his “methodology of scientific research programmes” both
                                         
13  Lakatos’ work in particular has attracted attention among economic methodologists,
beginning with Latsis (1976). Hands (1985) is an excellent, critical discussion of Lakatos.
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levels, that is, both the level of the individual theory and the more aggregate
level. Moreover, while Popper’s model of scientific change is essentially
normative and Kuhn’s is essentially descriptive, Lakatos’ model has both a
normative and a positive component.
The important organizing category in Lakatos’ model is “the
scientific research program”, which is clearly a more detailed analogy to Kuhn’s
concept of paradigm. Specifically, it should be thought of as a series of theories
that comprise a continuous because they share some so-called “hard core
propositions”. The research programme changes by modifying propositions in
the “protective belt” (a “heuristic” informs the researcher about how this should
legitimately be done), while keeping intact the hard core. This is so far a
descriptive model of scientific activity. But Lakatos adds a normative
dimension by introducing notions of progression and degeneration:
“Let us take a series of theories, T1, T2, T3,.... where each subsequent
theory results from adding auxiliary clauses to...the previous
theory in order to accommodate some anomaly, each theory having
at least as much content as the unrefuted content of its predecessor.
Let us say that such a series of theories is theoretically progressive (or
‘constitutes a theoretically progressive problemshift’) if each new theory
has some excess empirical content over its predecessor...Let us say
that a theoretically progressive series of theories is also empirically
progressive (or ‘constitutes an empirically progressive problemshift’) if
some of this excess empirical content is also corrobated...Finally, let
us call a problemshift progressive if it is both theoretically and
empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not” (Lakatos 1970,
p.118).
By “excess empirical content” is here meant that the relevant theory predicts
some “novel fact” (this is the Popperian legacy that raises its head).
20
When research programmes degenerate, it is rational for the
individual scholar to leave it in favor of some alternative and competing
research programme, provided this has a better track record.  This overall
structure of reasoning - which has been only extremely briefly dealt with here
- has been employed in numerous studies in economic methodology. How
does it fare as an explanation of the breakthrough of the NGT?
It is rather immediately apparent that the NGT belongs to “the
neoclassical research programme”: although proponents of the NGT fancy
referring to Solowian growth theory as “neoclassical” in order to distinguish it
from their own work (e.g., Romer 1994), there can be no doubt, of course, that
the NGT is neoclassical and should be seen as a set of theories in a broader
neoclassical research programme. The emphasis on casting all decision problem
as maximization problems and casting all interaction among agents in
equilibrium terms are what immediately qualifies the NGT as neoclassical.
Specific NGT theories should be considered as belonging to the protective belt
of the larger neoclassical research programme.
The problem, however, is that while the NGT may neatly be
characterized as part of the neoclassical research programme, the Lakatosian
approach does not appear to help us understand its success. This is essentially
because the NGT does not predict any novel facts, not even relative to the
background knowledge existing in the neoclassical research programme.14 That
knowledge accumulation is a crucial driver  behind economic growth is, as
                                         
14  Henrik Lando has pointed out to me, however, that models based on the NG, but used for
other purposes, have yielded novel insights. For example, it has recently been demonstrated
that long-run neutrality of money does not necessarily obtain in such models. However, notice
that 1) many Keynesians have consistently denied long-run neutrality, and 2) the “novel fact”
in question could hardly have been anticipated by those who proposed the first NGT models
ten or so years ago. More to the point, perhaps, Jan Fagerberg has pointed out that the NGT
put forward at least one novel fact, namely that there need not be convergence between rates
of growth among nations, and that this partly accounts for the success of the NGT.
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previously mentioned, no new recognition at all. The welfare and policy
conclusions of the NGT do not seem to imply any novel facts, either (as Romer
(1994, p.21) admits).
We may quite sensibly argue that Lakatos’ criteria for scientific
criteria are simply too harsh. In fact, the Lakatosian philosopher, John Worrall
(1978) long ago suggested that we modify Lakatos’ notion of novelty and his
criteria of acceptance of a theory in the following way:
“The methodology of scientific research programmes regards a
theory as supported by any fact, a ‘correct’ description of which it
implies, provided the fact was not used in the construction of the
theory” (Worrall 1978, p.50).
The problem here, however, is that it is precisely the case with the
NGT that “the fact” is “used in the construction of the theory”; specifically, that
the “fact” that knowledge is a motor of growth is both an assumption and a
prediction in the theory.  Therefore, on Lakatosian standards, the NGT would
appear to be a degenerating theoretical development, which rational scientists
should stay away from. But they don’t. Clearly, something must be wrong here.
It would seem to be the case, therefore that Lakatos’ model cannot
help us understand the success of the NGT: the theory has met with success,
but it essentially has very little new to say. Some other mechanisms must be at
work. In my view, we obtain a better understanding of the issue under
consideration here if we turn instead to the work of Larry Laudan (1977).
Like Lakatos and Kuhn, Laudan argues that scientific theories
normally belong to some ongoing scientific tradition, but idea of the “research
tradition” is more flexible than Kuhn’s “paradigm” or Lakatos’ “scientific
research programme”. For example, he drops Lakatos’ idea of the hard core, in
the sense of a set of core propositions that unite all theories in the program, in
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favor of an argument that research traditions are animated more by certain
methodological and even metaphysical commitments. Thus, what makes a
theory belong to, for example, the neoclassical research tradition is perhaps
more the theoretical style with which the argument is constructed than the
specific underlying assumptions.15
However, what is more important in the present context, Laudan
supplies a concept of scientific progress that is considerably more flexible and
realistic than Lakatos’. The key to understanding Laudan’s view lies in his
conception of scientific activity as continuous problem-solving relative to pre-
defined motivating puzzles and questions, and situational constraints dictated
by the research tradition within which the problem-solving efforts take place. It
is the framing of puzzles and questions in the context of the constraints dictated
by the research tradition that makes questions and puzzles into well-defined
problems. Successful scientific activity consists in solving the puzzles by
problem-solving that has been framed in this way, it is not a matter of putting
forward “bold conjectures” or presenting “novel facts” per se.
According to Laudan, scientific problems come in two overall
categories: empirical and theoretical. The latter category primarily refer to
internal consistencies and shall not be further discussed here. The category of
empirical problems, however, is directly relevant, for a research tradition
confronts an empirical problem when its assumptions “forbid” the occurrence
of a specific real-world phenomena. For example, economics for a long time
“forbid” the existence of vertically integrated firms. That the modern theory of
the firm is considered as an instance of theoretical progress is not a matter of its
putting forward a new novel fact - firms have been known to exist for quite
                                         
15 One may argue that the increased interest in bounded rationality in neoclassical economics
in recent years is a case in point: Kreps, Hart, Aumann, Hahn and others are interested in
bounded rationality because they see problems in maximizing rationality, but does this make
them any less neoclassical?
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some time - but a matter of its rationalizing a hitherto ill-understood empirical
phenomenon, that is, solving an empirical problem by “assimilating” it under
the neoclassical research tradition (for example, Sanford Grossman and Oliver
Hart 1986).
This, then, is the explanation for the apparent success of the NGT, a
theory that does not appear to predict any novel facts or incorporate key
insights of other approaches to growth: the NGT successfully solved an
empirical problem - endogenous technological change - and assimilated it into
neoclassical economics, conforming to the constraints dictated by this research
tradition. It thus demonstrated the continued viability of the neoclassical
traditions and hindered a crisis situation provoked by an inability to come
grips with an important empirical problem. The fact that growth and structural
change would appear to have emerged as important problems on the agenda of
economists at about the time of the emergence of the NGT further confirms that
this is a case of theoretical progress in Laudan’s sense: not only did the NGT
solve an empirical problem, it solved an important empirical problem.
This view of theoretical progress also means that it is not directly
relevant (at least to the proponent of the NGT) to assess her work against the
work of neoinstitutional or evolutionary economists. Her work should be
assessed against what came before within the research tradition, specifically
relative to the neoclassical predecessor, the Solow model. While the NGT does
not present any “novel facts” in the Lakatosian sense, it does solve problems
that could not be solved within the confines of the Solow model.
Is this scientific progress? In the eyes of most mainstream
economists, it certainly is. What is their justification for thinking so? I my view,
the implicit working methodology of many mainstream economists is not, as
has often been asserted, Friedmanite instrumentalism (Milton Friedman 1953),
but rather some sort of “modified essentialism” (Popper 1983), according to
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which the aim of science (economics) is to probe deeper and deeper into the
structure of the (social) world. The realist idea of the aim of science as the
uncovering of the workings of the mechanisms that operate underneath
observable events really seems to enjoy a broad, but implicit, acceptance.
In such a view, scientific progress occurs when a theory (such as
the NGT) is formed that provides a truthlike (and, we may add, more formal)
description of a deeper essential layer (endogenous technological change) of the
object (economic growth) than its predecessor (Solowian growth theory) (cf.
Uskali Mäki 1991, p.87).  This is not exactly the same as Laudan’s perspective,
but it would seem to be consistent with it.
From a new institutionalist (North 1990) or evolutionary (1982)
perspective, the perspectives that have implicitly shaped the arguments of this
paper, the NGT would only appear to constitute a case of scientific progress in
the context of the neoclassical research programme. For proponents of these
research programmes will maintain that they have uncovered even deeper
essential layers - such as property rights institutions and firm capabilities -
than have  NGT economists. From such a perspective, the NGT hardly
constitutes a case of significant scientific progress.
Concluding Comments
This paper has had both a substantial and a methodological orientation. The
substantial contribution was to present a critique of the NGT. I here argued that
the NGT is characterized by a certain tautological quality, that it suppresses
what many economists would regard as the ultimate determinants of growth
and growth differentials, namely institutions, and that it is largely a
formalization of insights that have been well-known to economists for decades.
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The methodological contribution was to use this critique to discuss
alternative explanations of how economic theorists make choices with respect
to the acceptance of new theories. I believe that my discussion is one further
small nail in the coffin of Lakatosian methodology (if that is really needed after
Hands 1985): the NGT has been successful, not because it presented any “novel
facts”, or because it was in any way “theoretically and empirically
progressive”, but because it carried further general equilibrium theory and
demonstrated how this could be extended so that important empirical
problems could be solved within the constraints dictated by the neoclassical
research tradition.
An important final consideration here concerns the amount and
allocation of research effort: the NGT did not prosper until the profession’s
attention had turned considerably away from macroeconomic issues and until
this shift of interest released the required resources.  This simple consideration
suggests a final point that can only be tentatively presented here: economic
methodology should pay much more attention to genuinely economic factors
when accounting for theory choice, change of research programmes, etc. The
economics of the allocation of research resources and which problems get top
priority may be decisive for the evolution of economics. Instead of playing
underlabourers to both philosophers and economists, economic methodologists
should assert themselves as economists and to a much larger extent use
economic tools in the analysis of the choices that theorists make.
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